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FEDERAL PROCEDURE: ERIE-HANNA RULE HELD NOT
TO COMPEL FEDERAL APPLICATION OF STATE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
In the instant decision the federal district court determined that
it was not bound by a state rule which directed dismissal of ac-
tions involving the internal affairs of foreign corporations. In
light of the "equal protection" guidelines laid down by Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins and Hanna v. Plumer in order to ascertain the ap-
plicability of state law in diversity cases, significant questions are
raised by the court's "substance-procedure" approach and its asser-
tion that the area covered by the state rule had been pre-empted
by the federal doctrine of "forum non conveniens" embodied in
section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code.
A RECENT MANIFESTATION of the conceptual difficulties produced
by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins1 and its progeny is Lapides v. Doner,
in which a Michigan federal district court held that it was not com-
pelled to follow a relevant state forum non conveniens rule. To
reach this result, the court determined that state principles of forum
non conveniens are not rules of "substantive law binding on Fed-
eral Courts under the Erie doctrine." 3 Therefore, although a differ-
ent outcome would have resulted had the suit been brought in a
Michigan state court, "this 'outcome determination' approach was
discredited in the recent case of Hanna v. Plumer"4 and therefore
1304 U.S. 64 (1939).
2 248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965).
31d. at 891-92.
'Id. at 890. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Supreme Court was
faced with a conflict between the operation of FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (1), which allows
service of process to be made by delivery of the summons and complaint to the
defendant's usual place of abode, and a Massachusetts statute which requires in-hand
delivery of process where the defendant is executor or administrator of an estate.
In holding that service according to the provisions of rule 4 (d) (1) did not violate
the limitations imposed upon the federal courts by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, the
Court redefined the implications of Erie and explained as follows the interpretation
purportedly laid down by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945):
"'Outcome-determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. ...
Indeed, the message of York itself is that choices between state and federal law are
to be made not by application of any automatic, 'litmus paper' criterion, but rather
by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule." 380 U.S. at 466-67.
would not be controlling. Furthermore, the court held' that local
forum non conveniens rules had been largely pre-empted for federal
court purposes by the enactment of section 1404 (a) of the Judicial
Code.6 Significant questions are raised by the court's reliance upon
Hanna, for there, while the Supreme Court asserted that Congress
may enact any rule of federal practice rationally classifiable as pro-
cedural,t the conflicting state and federal rules were deemed to be
"of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of the forum.",, Under-
lying Hanna, therefore, is a vital concern related to the discourage-
ment of forum-shopping, precisely the type of forum-shopping which
would be provoked by application of the disparate rules of forum
non conveniens within the state and federal courts of Michigan.
In Lapides a stockholder's derivative action was brought in
Michigan against an Ohio corporation doing extensive business in
Michigan and five of its directors. The suit involved certain ques-
tions of control and managment of the internal affairs of the cor-
poration,9 and both declaratory and injunctive relief were prayed
for. On a motion to dismiss, defendant invoked Michigan's strict
internal affairs rule, under which the state courts will not entertain
suits wherein they are called upon to exert visitorial control over
the internal operations of a foreign corporation.1" The district court
1248 F. Supp. at 892.
C"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1964).
"[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules gov-
erning the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to
regulate matters which though falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." 380 U.S. at 472.
8 1d. at 469. "We cannot seriously entertain the thought that one suing an estate
would be led to choose the federal court because of a belief that adherence to
Rule 4 (d) (1) is less likely to give the executor actual notice than § 9 [the Massa-
chusetts service rule], and therefore more likely to produce a default judgment.
Rule 4(d)(1) is well designed to give actual notice, as it did in this case." Id. at
469 n.ll.
oThe action was brought by three individual directors and a minority shareholder
against the corporation and five directors for a declaratory judgment that a meeting
of DWG Cigar Corporation of Ohio be declared null and void. At the meeting
in question, one of the plaintiffs was removed as chairman of the board and of
the executive committee; another was replaced as vice-chairman of the board and
his position on the executive committee was eliminated; one of the defendants was
elected chairman of the board; and the counsel of the corporation was changed.
In addition, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the individual defendants from exercising
the powers of the offices to which they had been elected at the meeting. 248 F. Supp.
at 885.
20 "[I]t would seem that if this Court were to follow the Michigan [internal affairs]
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rule stated in Wojtczak [v. American United Life Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W.
364 (1940)], it would be obliged to decline jurisdiction of the instant case." 248
F. Supp. at 886. "[The internal affairs doctrine] appears to be a Michigan rule of
forum non conveniens in the limited class of cases involving control and manage-
ment of the internal affairs of foreign corporations." Id. at 887.
The rule that a court will refuse to exercise jurisdiction in suits involving the
management by the court of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation has been
generally accepted in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Allen v. Montana Ref. Co.,
71 Mont. 105, 227 Pac. 582 (1924); Lewisolin v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 26
Misc. 613, 56 N.Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1899); National Baptist Convention v. Taylor,
402 Pa. 501, 166 A.2d 521 (1961); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws § 146, at 413 (1962);
STU BERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 450-53 (3d ed. 1963); Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corpora-
tions, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 143-44 (1955). The doctrine has apparently been applied in
at least twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia. See 17 FLETCHER, PIVATE
CoPoRI os § 8425 (rev. ed. 1960) (cited by the Michigan Supreme Court in
Woitczak).
In its earliest development the internal affairs rule was not considered to be
discretionary but rather was phrased in terms of lack of jurisdiction. Comment, 31
MICH. L. REv. 682 (1933); Note, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 492 (1933); see, e.g., Kahn v.
American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950); Taylor v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 97 Va. 60, 33 S.E. 385 (1899); STUMBERG, op. cit. supra at
450-51. This attitude may have been a result of the early belief that corporations
were the creation of the state of incorporation and had no legal existence outside
the incorporating state, see, e.g., Royal Fraternal Union v. Lunday, 51 Tex. Civ.
App. 637, 640, 133 S.E. 185, 187 (1908); 17 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra, § 8427 & n.76;
or a consequence of the notion that courts of the state of incorporation should
exercise all of the jurisdiction which they possess, local courts thus abstaining re-
gardless of countervailing local policy considerations. See Note, 33 COLUM. L. REv.
492, 495-96 (1933). The prevailing view today, however, is that the rule is a dis-
cretionary matter based upon considerations of the effectiveness of the relief which
might be granted by the court, the difficulties of applying the corporation law of
the incorporating state, and the possibility of conflicting decrees being rendered by
the incorporating state. E.g., State ex ret. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa
784, 818-27, 2 N.W.2d 372, 391-95 (1942); Koster v. Shenandoah Corp., 258 App.
Div. 1079, 18 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1940); see, e.g., Williamson v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co., 56 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1932); American Creosote Works v. Powell, 298 Fed.
417, 419-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 595 (1924); STUMBERG, op. cit. supra at
450-53; Latty, supra at 144; Note, 46 COLTM. L. REy. 415, 416 (1946); 18 MINN. L.
REV. 192, 200-03 (1934).
Because these policy objectives were not always served by dismissal of cases in-
volving the management of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, a number
of exceptions to the doctrine were developed. Thus, courts have exercised jurisdic-
tion where the decree could be effectively managed by the court, see, e.g., Lydia E.
Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 53, 9 N.E.2d 573 (1937); Sharp v. Big
Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103 P.2d 430 (1940); where a large proportion of
the corporation's assets were present in the forum state or where the directors,
officers, or books of the corporation resided in the forum state. See, e.g., Babcock v.
Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 91 N.E. 683 (1910); 17 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra, § 8427 n.92;
Latty, supra at 144; Comment, 31 MICH. L. REv. 682, 684 n.12, 685 n.13 (1933).
The federal courts adopted the internal affairs rule in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1933), wherein the Court stated:
"It has long been settled doctrine that a court-state or federal-sitting in one
State will as a general rule decline to interfere with . . . the management of the
internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another State but will
leave controversies as to such matters to the courts of the State of the domicile ....
Obviously no definite rule of general application can be formulated . . . but it
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in denying the motion, on the basis of its own substance-procedure
analysis, rejected the notion that the internal affairs rule was bind-
ing on it and asserted that this particular embodiment of the forum
non conveniens concept" had been superseded by section 1404 (a).12
safely may be said that jurisdiction will be declined whenever considerations of con-
venience, efficiency and justice point to the courts of the State of the domicile as
appropriate tribunals for the determination of the particular case."
Since it was generally felt that the decision in Rogers did not serve "considera-
tions of convenience, efficiency and justice," the decision was regarded as an adoption
of a strict internal affairs rule. See Comment, 31 MicH. L. REv. 682, 694-95 (1933);
18 MINN. L. Rav. 192, 199-200 (1934). In Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S.
549, 554-57 (1946), the Supreme Court clarified the criteria to be used by federal
judges in refusing such cases when acting within their own discretion: "We mention
this . . . to put the rule of forum non conveniens in proper perspective. It was
designed as an 'instrument of justice.' Maintenance of a suit away from the domicile
of the defendant-whether he be a corporation or an individual-might be vexatious
or oppressive .... The relief sought against a foreign corporation may be so exten-
sive or call for such detailed and continuing supervision that the matter could be
more efficiently handled nearer home. The limited territorial jurisdiction of the
federal court might indeed make it difficult for it to make its decree effective. But
where in this type of litigation only a money judgment is sought, the case normally
is different. The fact that .the claim involves complicated affairs of a foreign corpora-
tion is not alone a sufficient reason for a federal court to decline to decide it. The
same may be true even where an injunction is sought." (Footnotes omitted.)
The Court in Williams thus integrated some of the policies behind the internal
affairs rule with the normal considerations of the "vexation and harassment" aspect
of forum non conveniens (see note 11 infra), thus making it nearly indistinguishable
from the general rule of forum non conveniens which would be enunciated in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See notes 14-17 infra and accom-
panying text. In many jurisdictions, however, "strict application of the internal
affairs rule will often reach a result diametrically opposed to the doctrine of forum
non conveniens .... ." Note, 46 COLUM. L. Rv. 413, 415 (1946). Despite the dis-
similarity in motivating policies and sometimes in result, the internal affairs rule
has been regarded as a type of forum non conveniens rule (see Latty, supra at 144)
ever since the landmark article by Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1929), wherein it was argued that
refusal of jurisdiction should be used in American jurisprudence as an instrument
of justice.
"'For purposes of analysis, various manifestations of the forum non conveniens
concept may be described as follows: (1) those rules which attempt to nettralize
the plaintiff's efforts to vex and harass the defendant by the selection of an in-
appropriate forum; (2) procedures whereby a state may refuse to exercise jurisdic-
tion in an action between nonresidents for nonstatutory torts arising outside the
state based upon the notion of insufficient "contacts" between the parties or the
cause of action and the state, see, e.g., Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d
60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1965); Gregoris v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235
N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923); (3) the internal affairs rules, similar to the one
adopted by Michigan, note 10 supra. It was the first of these forms, namely that
relating to vexation and harassment, which predominated in the federal court
system prior to the enactment of § 1404(a). See Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See gen-
erally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. Rav. 380 (1947);
Blair, supra note 10; Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv.
908 (1947); Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REv. 867 (1935); Foster,
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Assuming arguendo that the characterization of the state rule as one
of forum non conveniens is correct, the court should have reached
the question unexplored by Hanna-namely, whether Congress may
direct the application of a rule of practice when it so affects the
result of litigation as to provoke forum-shopping and a concomitant
unequal administration of justice. If Congress has this power,
Hanna would appear to call for an "arguably procedural" analysis
with respect to section 1404 (a). Neither of these steps subsequent
to the characterization of the Michigan rule was in fact taken by
the Lapides court.
In order to determine in the first instance if there is indeed a
collision between the relevant state and federal rules as interpreted
and applied by the court in Lapides, it is necessary to consider the
appropriateness of the designation of the internal affairs doctrine
and section 1404 (a) as rules in the nature of forum non conveniens.
In this connection the Reviser's comments state that section 1404 (a)
was "drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens" with transfer substituted for dismissal.' 3 The contours of
this doctrine were not delineated, although the leading exposition
of federal forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court decision in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,4 is frequently consulted as a reliable
guide to legislative intent with respect to section 1404 (a).' 5 In Gulf
Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARv.
L. RE . 41 (1930).
12248 F. Supp. at 891-94.
"
3Reviser's Note, following 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1964); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. A132 (1947). See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. Ci. L. REv. 405, 418 (1955). The Reviser's note has been accepted as authori-
tative by the Supreme Court. United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78,
81 (1949).
14 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
1 2 E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 851 (1950); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1950).
The legislative history of § 1404(a) sheds little light on the extent to which
the statute was intended to pre-empt the area of designation of the appropriate
forum. The rule was promulgated after a letter from Professor Moore to the Re-
visers on March 7, 1945, prompted by the decision in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44 (1941), which held that courts could not enjoin the prosecution of
Federal Employers' Liability Act cases in other jurisdictions. Professor Moore sug-
gested that this holding be vitiated by statutory provisions allowing transfer of
cases where venue is both proper and improper. Sections 1404 (a) and 1406 (a) were
thereupon included in the second draft of Title 28 of the United States Code
considered May 28-30, 1945, by the Advisory Committee of the House Committee on
the Revision of the Laws. MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 205-06
(1949). The Kepner case, in conjunction with decisions holding that courts lacked
power to dismiss actions brought under the special venue provisions of the FELA,
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Oil the Court listed nine factors incident to a forum non conveniens
determination,16 two of which were the necessity of handling prob-
lems in law foreign to the forum court and the possible ineffective-
ness of the forum to administer the relief sought.1 These two
particular factors had long been an integral part of the forum non
conveniens concept;' 8 it is therefore inconceivable that they did
not fall within the ambit of the principle of forum non conveniens
introduced into federal civil practice by the passage of section
see, e.g., Leet v. Union Pac. R.R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944), led to a
nation-wide practice of ambulance chasing in FELA suits against railroads. See
generally Hearings on H.R. 1639 Before Subcommittee No. 4, House Committee on
the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4 (1947). Section 1404(a) was, therefore, a
direct response to the abuses which had surrounded selection of "oppressively in-
appropriate forums" in FELA cases. Currie, supra note 13, at 418.
Subsequent to the incorporation of § 1404 (a) into the proposed revision of Title
28, but prior to the actual enactment of that section, the Supreme Court explored
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in .the federal court system in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, supra note 14. This decision was construed by many courts to indicate
the proper application of § 1404(a), thus limiting transfers to those cases where
the defendant could show such inconvenience as to demonstrate vexation and
harassment. Currie, supra note 13, at 419 n.41, 435-36; see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. V.
Ryan, supra. The Supreme Court, however, foreclosed such an interpretation in
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955), by holding that § 1404(a) gave dis-
cretion to transfer even though the case would not have been dismissed under
a forum non conveniens theory.
The import of the congressional history can be summarized by the observation
that § 1404 (a) was primarily designed to prevent litigation in inconvenient forums.
However, its precise relationship to state rules of forum non conveniens was never
defined. It would seem that if the application of § 1404(a) precluded dismissals
in the federal courts, as has been contended by some commentators (see IA MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACrIcE 0.317 (2d ed. 1959); Currie, supra note 13, at 437), state rules
of forum non conveniens could no longer be effective vehicles to grant dismissals
in federal courts. Doubt is cast on this conclusion, however, by the fact that federal
courts have continued to grant dismissals of cases which might have been trans-
ferred within the United States. See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 187 F.2d 364 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951); Sheridan v. American Motors Corp., 132 F.
Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1955); cf. 46 CORNELL L.Q. 318 (1961) (advocating conditional
dismissals where § 1404(a) could not be utilized); 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 208
(1955) (advocating dismissal where the plaintiff has abused his privilege to choose
a forum by harassing the defendant).
16330 U.S. at 508-09.
"Among .the additional factors mentioned by the Court were "the relative ease
of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process . . . . the cost
of obtaining attendance of . . . witnesses; possibility of view of premises . . . ,
[and] administrative difficulties .. .when litigation is piled up in congested centers
instead of being handled at its origin." Ibid.
"SSee Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130-32 (1933); Williams v.
Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 555-57 (1946). The problem of interpreting
foreign law and the possible ineffectiveness of a decree of the forum court were
elements specifically enumerated by Blair in his 1929 article which made the term
"forum non conveniens" current in this country. See Blair, supra note 10, at 22,
27-29.
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1404 (a).19
Similarly, the Michigan rule involved in Lapides calls for auto-
matic dismissal upon a showing that the action involves the control
or management of a foreign corporation precisely because this pro-
cedure obviates the necessity to apply foreign law and avoids the
possibility that the court will be unable to enforce the appropriate
decrees. 20 In short, the Michigan internal affairs doctrine is a forum
non conveniens rule composed of only two operative factors, both
of which in turn are part of the forum non conveniens concept
that underlies section 1404 (a). Thus it is at least arguable that
section 1404 (a), by the incorporation of the two elements which
underpin the Michigan rule, leaves little room for an independent
application of this internal affairs doctrine in the federal courts.21
The Supreme Court has never determined whether consistent
application of the Erie-Hanna standards compels the federal courts
to respect any of the state rules of forum non conveniens, in partic-
ular the internal affairs variation.22 Prior to the passage of section
10 While the Court in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955), asserted that
§ 1404 (a) is not a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it empha-
sized that the purpose in drawing a distinction "is not to say that the relevant
factors have changed . . . but only that the discretion to be exercised [by the
district judge] is broader." Id. at 32. See Kaufman, Observations on Transfers
Under Section 1404(a) of the New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 598, 605 (1951).
Compare Currie, supra note 13, at 418. See generally MooRE, COMMENTARY ON TE
U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 204-06 (1949); 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 0.317 (2d ed.
1959); WRirHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 44 (1963); Kaufman, Further Observations on
Transfers Under Section 1404(a), 56 COLuMa. L. REv. 1 (1956).
20 Wojtczak v. American United Life Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W. 364
(1940); see 248 F. Supp. at 886.
21 The doctrine of pre-emption is not limited to those situations in which state
and federal laws are found to be in direct and obvious conflict; rather, when
operation of the state law effects a different result or otherwise intrudes into an
area dealt with by Congress, the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsr. art. VI, dictates
that the state rule give way. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 812 U.S. 52 (1941). By
considering various factors, including the two of crucial importance in the Michigan
rule, Congress in passing section 1404(a) in effect set forth a test by which the
federal courts were permitted to allow a suit to be heard in the most convenient
forum available in lieu of dismissal. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29,
32 (1955); Currie, supra note 13, at 418. It is therefore arguable that since Con-
gress has indicated that federal courts are not to dismiss when considering these
factors in conjunction with several others, a rule requiring such courts to dismiss
by virtue of these two factors alone must necessarily interfere with the operation
of the rule as prescribed by Congress.
22 See 248 F. Supp. at 891-92. The court in Lapides noted that the Supreme
Court had reserved decision on the issue of the application of state forum non
conveniens rules in the federal courts in Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
330 U.S. 518 (1947), and Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946).
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected
1119
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1404 (a), the Court avoided this issue by holding that the disposition
of the particular cases would have been identical under either fed-
eral forum non conveniens or the state rules;2 the lower federal
courts have split when confronted with the proposition that section
1404 (a) pre-empts the internal affairs rule.24 However, the Hanna
the position that the state rules were binding, expressing its views in the following
manner: "However, in bath Koster and Williams, the Supreme Court gave strong
indications that if it were compelled to decide the question, it would hold that
Federal Courts are not obliged to follow a state rule declining jurisdiction in
cases involving internal affairs of foreign corporations . . . . The Court in both
'cases clearly rejected the general principle that jurisdiction must be declined in
cases involving the internal affairs of foreign corporations. Having rejected the
general principle, the Court only then went on to note in bath cases that state
law, if applicable, would not require any different result. But if the Court had felt
compelled to follow state law, the proper procedure would have been to discuss
state law first and apply it rather than to discuss the general principle first and
then note parenthetically that state law would lead to the same result." 248 F.
Supp. at 890-91. (Emphasis in original.)
It would seem, however, that the Supreme Court in rejecting .the general internal
affairs rule was addressing itself solely to the question of when federal judges could
within their discretion decline to exercise jurisdiction regardless of the state rule.
If a state court would not dismiss but the federal court chooses to do so under
a federal rule of forum non conveniens there is no question but that the court is
proceeding within the proper boundaries of the discretion accorded by Williams and
Gulf Oil and is "acting within its autonomous administration of the discharge of
its own judicial duties." 32 MINN. L. REv. 633, 636 (1948). Contra, Braucher, supra
note 11, at 928. The only area where a conflict between the state and federal rules
would raise an Erie question would be where the state rule dictates dismissal but
the federal rule does not. Traditional notions of judicial restraint would appear
to demand that the Supreme Court in Williams and Koster first apply the federal
standards for discretionary dismissals in order to determine if there is such a con-
flict before it embarks on resolving the difficult constitutional question relating to
whether federal courts are compelled to follow the state internal affairs rule.
23 Gulf Oil and Williams have been criticized for avoiding the Eric question.
The commentators have felt that the state rules of forum non conveniens involved
in each of the decisions, properly interpreted, would have produced different results
than those which the Supreme Court attributed to them. Braucher, supra note 11,
at 928; Note, 46 COLUm. L. Rlv. 413, 425 . n.66 (1946).
2, Prior to Lapides, federal courts generally respected state internal affairs rules
by either dismissing or transferring. Thus, before passage of § 1404(a) Judge
Learned Hand held in Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945), that federal
courts were bound by state internal affairs doctrines. Contra, Hall v. American Cone
& Pretzel Co., 71 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Subsequent to the enactment of
§ 1404(a), federal courts have still respected such rules. Sheridan v. American
Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (dismissal); Josephson v. McGuire,
121 F. Supp. 83 (D. Mass.) (granting transfer), petition for writ of mandamus dis-
missed, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954). In Josephson the court stated "though it
may be that this state rule does not govern a federal court sitting in Massachusetts,
the policy expressed in State decisions ought not to be regarded as entirely without
weight in the exercise of this Court's discretion." 121 F. Supp. at 84. (Emphasis in
original.)
The commentators are generally split as to whether Erie compels federal courts to
follow state rules of forum non conveniens. See Note, 46 CoLuM. L. REv. 413, 428-29
(1946) (applying the outcome test); 32 MINN. L. REv. 633, 635 (1948) (irrespective of
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opinion, despite extensive discussion concerning uniform applica-
tion of rules in the state and federal courts to avoid forum-shopping,
manifests a decided propensity to give effect to federal rules which
"really regulate procedure."2 5
In view of the Supreme Court's silence on the particular issue,
it may be queried whether the pre-empting of the Michigan rule
is constitutionally allowable, that is, whether disparate treatment of
a forum-state litigant by state and federal courts may be objection-
able on grounds of fundamental unfairness. Although it is far from
being explicitly stated in Hanna, it has been argued that some
limitation upon Congress' power to effect a different outcome in
the federal courts from that which is anticipated in the respective
state courts is probably imposed by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.26 Furthermore, it has been recently pointed out
in this connection that the "fairness" requirements of the due
process clause might well contain the rudiments of equal protec-
tion; 27 that is to say, a forum-state litigant may have an affirmative
right, protected by the due process clause, to receive treatment in
the federal courts similar to that which would obtain in a state
court, unless the policy considerations underlying the state rule
should be outweighed by an interest grounded in a need for uni-
form federal procedure, by the policy rationale of the federal rule,28
classification as substance or procedure, convenience should govern); STAN. INTRA. L. REv.
28, 31-32 (1948) (forum non conveniens rules representing considerations as to the work-
load of state courts should not be respected). Some authorities have taken the position
that federal application of state forum non conveniens rules is probably not compelled.
MOORF, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CoDE 330-31 (1949); Barrett, supra note 11,
at 399; 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1946). But see Braucher, supra note 11, at 928-30 (Erie
compels respect of internal affairs rules but not other state rules of forum non
conveniens).
25 380 U.S. at 464, quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). See
380 U.S. at 469-71.
20 When the Court in Hanna states that Erie deals with "equal protection prob-
lems" arising from material differences in the result of litigation depending upon
whether it is commenced in a state or federal court, id. at 467-68, the primary
question arises concerning the status to be assigned to the Court's enunciations.
It has been strenuously asserted that the Court has promulgated constitutional doc-
.trine requiring some degree of uniformity in the total course of litigation in the
state and federal courts. See Comment, 1966 DuKE L.J. 142, 152-55. Other author-
ity, however, indicates that Hanna represents no more than a redefinition of the
Erie policy of uniformity. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes
Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884, 890 (1965). For purposes of this discussion, the former
view has been adopted.
27 Comment, 1966 D=c L.J. 142, 152-55.
28There may be some question as to whether the policies which the act of
Congress was attempting to further-in the instant case with the enactment of
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or by a federal concern with particular interstate litigation. 0
As has been suggested, the policy considerations underlying
Michigan's internal affairs rule relate to the convenience of the
court, saving it the rude task of having to interpret a sister state's
law and the possible embarrassment of being powerless to render an
effective injunctive decree.30 Likewise the parties litigant are bene-
§ 1404 (a)-will also be weighed against the degree of discrimination against the forum-
state defendant. In Hanna the Court utilized the policy behind rule 4 (d) (1) to
demonstrate that the defendant had not been denied effectuation of the policies of
the state rule:
"The purpose of this part of the [Massachusetts] statute, which is involved here,
is, as the court below noted, to insure that executors will receive actual notice of
claims . ... Actual notice is of course also the goal of Rule 4 (d) (1); how-
ever . ... by a method less cumbersome than that prescribed in § 9." 380 U.S.
at 463 n.l. (Emphasis in original.)
If the policies had not been identical, however, it is not entirely clear whether
the policy of the federal rule would have been used in addition to Congress'
interest in uniform procedure in the federal courts to balance against the denial
to the home-state defendant of the state policy determination. Some insight into
this problem may be supplied by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S.
525 (1958), in which the Supreme Court actively balanced the "strong federal policy
against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal
courts," id. at 538, against the discrimination resulting from allowing a federal jury
to decide a question which South Carolina law reserved to the judge. This, how-
ever, might be a special case since the courts were skirting the edge of the seventh
amendment.
The lower court decisions split after Byrd on the issue of which countervailing
interests would be balanced against the denial of the effectuation of state policies.
Some cases have put only the federal policy of procedural uniformity on the scales,
see, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1960),
while others have placed heavy emphasis upon the policies behind the particular
federal rule. See, e.g., Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65-66 (4th Cir.
1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960); lovino v. Water-
son, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959).
The use in Hanna of strong language in favor of the Federal Rules, see note
7 supra and accompanying text, might constitute a predetermination by the Court
of the weight to be given the need for uniform federal procedures and any dis-
crimination caused by the use of the rules will not be invidious when balanced
against this interest alone. Such an analysis would seem premature, however, in
that any discrimination in Hanna seemed very slight, see note 8 supra and accom-
panying text, and not at all indicative of possible conflicts between state policies
and the Federal Rules. The most tenable explanation would seem to be that the
Court was attempting to resolve the apparent conflict in the lower courts as to the
weight to be given to the need for procedural uniformity in the federal courts.
20 Where uniformity is sought for the benefit of "federal fiscal concerns, inter-
state waterways, patent and copyright law and federal statutes in general, federal
decisional law has bourgeoned." Comment, 1966 DuKE L.J. 142, 148 & nn.32-38. The
Erie decision, however, implicitly negates the extension of uniformity into the appli-
cation by federal courts of non-procedural law where there is no special federal
interest. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
"0 See note 20 supra and accompanying text. There has been considerable ques-
tion whether the full faith and credit clause includes injunctive decrees within
its scope. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1909); McQuillen v. Dillon, 98 F.2d
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fited equally by Michigan's rule to the extent that they are inter-
ested in an efficaciously administered disposition of their legal
dispute.
After the rationale of the conflicting state rule is ascertained, it
is necessary to determine the degree to which application of the
federal standard frustrates the state's policy. Assuming that the fed-
eral court would apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction,31 it would
appear that Michigan's policies would be effectuated, rather than
frustrated, by adjudication in a federal court32 in view of the fact
that the federal court had determined that it was in a position to
administer effective relief.33 This conclusion is further supported
726, 729 (2d Cir. 1938); Burke v. Burke, 32 Del. Ch. 320, 86 A.2d 51 (Ch. 1952);
STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 10, at 120-27; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWs, § 434b, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). Such a decree, therefore, may
be a futile gesture, to the extent that it is directed toward parties not personally
before the forum-state's court.
3"The traditional choice of law rule with respect to the governance of the
internal affairs of a corporation has dictated application of the law of the state
of incorporation. See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 10, § 145, at 411-12; STUMBERG,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 450-53; Latty, supra note 10, at 148-49. This choice of
law rule is incorporated into Michigan's internal affairs doctrine. See note 52 infra
and accompanying text. Thus, no policy of Michigan would be frustrated by the
mere fact of application of .the law of the state of incorporation in the federal courts.
"2The conclusion that Michigan's policy determinations are not thwarted by the
very fact of adjudication in the federal courts is based upon an examination of
the two policy considerations underlying the internal affairs rule as enunciated by
the Michigan Supreme Court in the Wojtczak case. However, a more critical analysis
may well bring to light other state policies which may be affected by federal action.
For example, it is arguable that Michigan desires to encourage foreign corpora-
tions to do business in the state and to this end will not burden such corporations
by attempting to control their internal affairs. Indeed, the Michigan Corporation
Code states that "nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the regulation
of the organization or internal affairs of any foreign corporation heretofore or
hereafter admitted to this state." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.95 (1963). Furthermore,
Michigan may wish to insulate the corporation from the possibility of conflicting
decrees in that state and the state of incorporation. On the other hand, it may be
cogently argued that to the extent that it is in the best interest of a corporation
to have its internal disputes resolved and to the extent that it is undesirable for a
state to close its courts to nonresidents, a state rule which categorically excludes
consideration of the internal affairs of foreign corporations is nevertheless unwar-
rantedly discriminatory and should not be followed by the federal court. See notes
38-44 infra and accompanying text; cf. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d
60, 64-66 (4th Cir. 1965).
"Since all parties necessary to a complete disposition of the suit were apparently
present in Michigan, presumably either a state or federal court could have rendered
effective relief in the instant case. This fact demonstrates that the full sweep of
the Michigan rule as interpreted by the Lapides court is over-inclusive, at least
insofar as it is premised upon the enforceability-of-judicial-decrees policy argument.
That is to say, although it may be true generally that full and effective relief is
not available when the internal affairs of a foreign corporation are in issue, there
are exceptional circumstances when such is not the case. Indeed, the more flexible
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by the presumption that federal courts are competent to apply any
state's laws34 and by the observation that they have more experi-
ence in doing so as a result of hearing cases arising under diversity
jurisdiction.
An informative contrast to the factual circumstances of Lapides
with respect to the effect which frustration of state policy may have
upon the applicable law is presented by the situation involved in
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.3 5 Woods concerned a Mississippi
statute which closed the doors of that state's courts to suits brought
by foreign corporations that had not qualified to do business in
Mississippi. The question raised was whether a federal court sitting
in Mississippi could entertain a suit instituted by a corporation
which had not qualified pursuant to Mississippi law. The Supreme
Court held that it could not, noting that a "contrary result would
create discriminations against citizens of the State in favor of those
authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts."3 Here the underlying state policy was the undeniably
legitimate one of encouraging qualification by foreign corporations
before doing business in Mississippi,37 a policy which would have
been frustrated were the federal courts in Mississippi not required
to abstain from assuming jurisdiction.8
renditions of the internal affairs rule make provisions for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion when relief may be effectively administered by the forum court. See note 10
suprN.
3E.g., Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Owings v, Hull, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 607, 624-25 (1835); Strickland v. Humble Oil & Ref Co., 140 F.2d 83, 86 (5th
Cir. 1944). The combination of Erie, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), and
§ 1404 (a) imposes upon the federal courts the responsibility to apply the laws of
all fifty states.
': 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
8Id. at 538.
37 It may also be noted that Mississippi did not discriminate against foreign
corporations by summarily closing its courts to them without legitimate policy moti-
vation. Rather, the ability to invoke the judicial power of the state was merely
conditioned upon submission by the corporation to certain regulatory procedures
designed for the protection of the local citizenry. Such regulation as the state may
exercise over the operations of foreign corporations tends to place these entities on
a par with domestic corporations, which of course are likewise subject to local
control. See, e.g., Neuchatel Asphalte Co. v. Mayor of New York, 155 N.Y. 373,
377, 49 N.E. 1043 (1898); William L. Bonnell Co. v. Katz, 23 Misc. 2d 1028, 1031,
196 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1960); discussion of Woods in Shulman v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
38Another relevant case, Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), involved a
purchase money mortgage given to a Virginia resident on Virginia land by a North
Carolina resident, and a North Carolina statute which precluded recovery of a
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Of course, even if no positive state policy to protect forum-state
litigants were discerned from Michigan's rule, it nevertheless re-
mains that the defendant has been denied the effect of the internal
affairs doctrine in such a manner as to give rise to forum-shopping.3 9
Because in the instant case the individual defendants were not sub-
ject to service of process in the state of incorporation,40 the uncon-
ditional dismissal of the action by a Michigan state court would
quite conceivably have ended the litigation.41 The upshot is that
deficiency judgment in a North Carolina court. When the question arose whether a
North Carolina federal court's jurisdiction was burdened with the same limitations
as those placed upon the state courts, the Supreme Court held in the affirmative,
concluding that "availability of diversity jurisdiction which was put into the Con-
stitution so as to prevent discrimination against outsiders is not to effect discrimina-
tion against the great body of local citizens." Id. at 192. Here the nondiscriminatory
state policy, relating to the protection of vendees who executed purchase money
mortgages, would have been frustrated by occasional suits in North Carolina federal
courts, with a disparity in treatment falling upon certain citizens of North Carolina
as a result of an accident of diversity of citizenship, and with the furtherance of
no counterbalancing federal policy.
30 ,[T]he twin aims of the Erie rule [are] .. .discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. at 468.
Forum-shopping in the present context appears to be a shorthand reference to
a decree of discrimination which is likely to recur and will affect the plaintiff's
choice of forum in any succeeding cases where the cause of action is similar. Of
course, forum-shopping is not inherently evil, for the federal courts are resorted to
every day in order to obtain the benefit of the Federal Rules. Furthermore, the
original purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to provide out-of-state litigants with
an alternative forum to avoid apprehended discrimination by state courts. Thus,
Professor McCoid has concluded that the prevention of forum-shopping is not appo-
site to the aims of Erie-Hanna. McCoid, supra note 26, at 888-89, 896; cf. Comment,
1966 DuKE L.J. 142, 162-63 n.85, 164 n.89.
Perhaps, however, a distinction may be drawn between the effect of a federal
procedural device which fortuitously produces disparate consequences in the state
and federal courts in an individual circumstance and a hypothetical rule which
would, upon the accrual of a cause of action, indicate to the plaintiff a decided
advantage were he to select one forum as opposed to the other. Thus, the need for
uniform procedures in the federal court may outweigh an isolated case of disparate
treatment but not necessarily a predictable pattern of discrimination.
40 248 F. Supp. at 894.
4" The court in Lapides strictly construed the rule of Wojtczak as not allowing
for the widespread exceptions commonly found incorporated into internal affairs
rules, see note 10 supra, and as not permitting dismissals conditioned upon the
defendants subjecting themselves to suit in another jurisdiction. See generally Vargas
v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39, aff'd per curiam, 25 N.J.
293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958), where the court con-
ditioned dismissal on the defendant's consent to appear in the appropriate forum
even though he would not be amenable to process there, to waive the statute of
limitations of the jurisdiction deemed appropriate, and to agree to pay the fees
incurred by the plaintiff in suing in New Jersey. The use of such conditional dis-
missals has long been advocated as a means of best using rules of forum non con-
veniens as an instrument of justice. See generally Currie, supra note 13, at 449;
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the mechanical application of the state rule would have rendered
the plaintiff without a forum in which to pursue his valid cause of
action. Furthermore, the Michigan rule would seem to disadvan-
tage the corporation solely because of its place of incorporation,
insofar as it is in the interest of the corporation to have its internal
disputes resolved. Thus, a refusal to apply the state rule can be
constitutionally defended on the theory that the provision for diver-
sity jurisdiction in the federal courts42 necessarily entails a certain
minimal deviation from state practice in order to prevent discrimi-
nation against the non-forum-state litigant. 43 Even apart from its
application in the federal court, there is some question whether
the Michigan rule as interpreted by the Lapides court would not be
vulnerable to attack on the theory that the state may not arbitrarily
bar a suit brought at the instance of a nonresident when no legiti-
mate state policy is thereby served. Certainly the operation of the
Michigan rule could be subjected to challenge when the most con-
venient forum, indeed perhaps the only available forum, is closed
to the litigants, particularly if the asserted policy rationale behind
Michigan's rule does not support this result.44
Foster, supra note 11, at 50; Note, 46 COLUM. L. Rav. 413, 430 (1946); 43 MINN. L.
REv. 1199 (1959) (approving the result of Vargas).
The narrow interpretation propounded by the Lapides court is somewhat surpris-
ing in view of the observation that it is difficult to characterize the holding in one
decision which relied largely on authority in a great number of states as defining a
mechanical rule to be applied universally without reference to the policies behind
it. Thus, the court might well have speculated that had the state courts been
confronted with the factual situation of Lapides they would have adopted a more
flexible version of the internal affairs rule.
,2 "The judicial power of the United States . . . shall extend to . . . controversies
between . . . citizens of different States .... " U.S. CONST. art. III.
43 "Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent appre-
hended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State." Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 74. "There is a much more fundamental reason,
however, for federal courts in diversity cases to refuse to apply any state rule like
this which discriminates against non-residents in allowing resort to its courts. The
purpose of the diversity jurisdiction is to avoid the results of state discrimination
against non-residents . . . . On that subject it is essential that the federal courts
be free to make their own decisions despite the views of any state." Shulman v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See
Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1965).
"In Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), the Supreme Court held that Wis-
consin was forbidden by the full faith and credit clause (U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1)
from closing its courts to a resident plaintiff suing a citizen of Wisconsin under a
foreign wrongful death statute. To the same effect, see First Nat'l Bank v. United
Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 398 (1952). It has been cogently argued that the actual basis
of the decision rests upon equal protection grounds; that is to say, a state may
not arbitrarily discriminate against some of its own citizens by closing its courts
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It might be thought that, instead of employing a due process-
equal protection analysis directed toward determining whether no-
tions of basic fairness to the respective litigants require the applica-
tion of a particular state rule, a court could discern the underlying
rationale of state law and policy by means of a simple substance-
versus-procedure approach. Indeed, the Lapides court used essen-
tially this latter method to distinguish the Woods decision from
the facts of the instant case. 45 However, it is questionable whether
the employment of such amorphous terms as "substance" and "pro-
cedure" will adequately bring into focus the elements of state
policy,46 nondiscriminatory in nature, which would be significantly
frustrated by application of the federal, rather than the state, rule
and which are not outweighed by some legitimate countervailing
federal interest. In the case of section 1404 (a), the federal statute
allows each party to an action in a federal court to petition the
court to have that suit litigated in the most convenient forum per-
missible. This procedure is primarily designed to eliminate harass-
ment of the defendant and to promote the dispensing of justice,
without entailing the hardships consequent to dismissal.47 It is
entirely possible that this federal interest might outweigh some
state laws and policies but not others, depending upon the nature
of the state policy and the degree to which the application of the
federal statute causes the result to stray from a comparable course
of litigation in the state courts.48 Thus, in the instant case, although
the result reached was diametrically opposed to that which would
to them merely because of the fortuity that their cause of action arose outside the
state. In similar circumstances, the failure to provide a forum for nonresidents "may
be a denial of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship." See CutuuE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS 308 (1963). See generally Currie, The
Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REv. 36, 268 (1959).
4,248 F. Supp. at 893-94.
"0The definitional problem inherent in the utilization of the "substance-pro-
cedure" dichotomy has been frequently recognized. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 810 U.S. 651 (1940); 1 BARRON & HoLTzOFF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 138, at 592-93 (Wright ed. 1960); Weintraub,
The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 89 IND. L. Rgv. 228, 231-32
(1964); Comment, 1966 DuKE L.J. 142, 144 & n.5.
"See notes 13, 21 supra and accompanying text.
"8See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 473: "Thus, though a court, in measuring a
Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitu-
tion, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the
character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow
in the state courts, . . . it cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and the guide-
lines suggested in York, were erected to serve another purpose altogether."
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have obtained in a state court, it is probable that the disposition
was proper in view of the federal interest in providing a convenient
forum, an interest which could be pursued without the frustration
of a valid state policy.49
Once it is determined that the application of section 1404 (a)
to the exclusion of a particular state forum non conveniens rule
does not exceed the limitations imposed by the due process clause
"9 A result similar to that in Lapides was reached by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), 66
CoLum. L. REV. 577 (1966), wherein the court stated that a "restriction [imposed by
a state rule of forum non conveniens] would not be binding on the federal court
since federal cognizance of the case would in no way frustrate state policy." 349
F.2d at 65. In Szantay the federal courts refused to consider themselves bound by
a state statute which denied state courts jurisdiction over suits brought by non-
residents against foreign corporations on foreign causes of action. Adopting the
balancing approach of Byrd v. Blue Ridge, see note 28 supra, the court of appeals
could discern no state policy which would have been frustrated by application of
a disparate federal rule. 349 F.2d at 65. On the other hand, "countervailing federal
considerations" were found to be "explicit" and "numerous" and manifested pri-
marily in the federal policy to avoid discrimination against nonresidents, inherent
in the grant of diversity jurisdiction, in the policy of the full faith and credit
clause "looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or
rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states . . . " and in the federal
interest in providing a convenient forum for litigation. Id. at 65-66. The court
distinguished Woods and Angel on the grounds that federal adjudication in either
of those cases would have frustrated a valid state policy, that the respective state
rules were nondiscriminatory in relation to nonresidents, and that no strong federal
policy considerations were present to swing the balance. Id. at 66.
In a sense Szantay was a more difficult case than Lapides because in the former
decision a state statute was directly involved, whereas in Lapides decisional law of
Michigan and a federal statute were implicated. Nevertheless, Szantay manifests a
decided bias in favor of the application of federal law. This propensity is explained
in part by the fact that the court did not adopt the notion that a certain uniformity
of outcome was required by the due process clause of the fifth amendment under
the circumstances of that case. See id. at 64; compare notes 26-29 supra and accom-
panying text. Rather, the court took the position that "if the state procedural pro-
vision is not intimately bound up with the right being enforced," then as a matter
of comity the state rule should be applied if the outcome would be thereby affected,
"unless there are affirmative countervailing federal considerations." 349 F.2d at 64.
Furthermore, the rather abrupt dismissal by the Szantay court of the state's forum
non conveniens rule may relate to the fact that the state rule fell into the tort
"contacts" classification, see note 11 supra. It has rather consistently been asserted
in cases involving this form of state forum non conveniens doctrine that the federal
courts would not be bound by the state rule either because no state policy would be
frustrated by adoption of an independent federal rule, see Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., supra at 64-65, or because § 1404 (a) had pre-empted the forum non conveniens
area. See Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955); cf. Shulman v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (dictum).
The foregoing rationale, however, does not speak directly to those instances involv-
ing other manifestations of state forum non conveniens concepts, such as the internal
affairs rule, which may involve viable state policies, nor does it consider the power
of Congress summarily to effect divergent results in the state and federal courts.
Compare notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
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when no valid state policy is thereby frustrated, it remains only to
be shown that it was within Congress' delegated powers to declare
such a rule. As long as section 1404 (a) operates wholly within the
sphere of providing the most convenient forum for litigation, with-
out affecting the law which is to be applied to the facts of the case,
it would seem to fall within Congress' article III powers.50 Further-
more, since Van Dusen v. Barrack5' established that the law to be
applied in the transferee court is that of the transferor court, in-
cluding its choice of law rules, section 1404 (a) appears not to exceed
its permissible boundaries. However, in Lapides the pre-empting of
the Michigan internal affairs rule has created a novel problem: what
choice of law rule should be utilized in view of the fact that the
Michigan courts have never been able to address themselves to the
formulation of an applicable guideline because of the very rule in
question. Nevertheless, in light of the requirement that section
1404 (a) shall not effect substantive changes in the law of the case,
it seems likely that the court in Lapides would be required to apply
that state's law which is consistent with the underlying rationale of
the Michigan rule, namely, the law of the state of incorporation.
52
This general due process-equal protection approach as yet re-
mains untested, having been merely suggested by some of the
Court's language in such cases as Erie, Hanna, and Woods. Further,
it cannot be denied that there exists substantial authority for the
proposition that state forum non conveniens rules now can be com-
pletely iguored since the passage of section 1404 (a).53 Nevertheless,
no See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965).
SI376 U.S. 612 (1964).
"It is obvious from the Wojtczak decision that Michigan considers the applicable
law to be that of the state of incorporation, a determination which comports with
traditional choice of law notions. See notes 10, 31 supra. Indeed, it is initially
necessary to determine that foreign law is applicable before jurisdiction may be
declined on the theory that the forum state is not competent to interpret and
apply foreign law.
Thus it appears that the Michigan internal affairs doctrine contains within itself
a choice of law rule directing the application of the law of the state of incorpora-
tion. Presumably, then, the federal courts would be compelled to follow this sub-
merged choice of law rule under the authority of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 312 U.S. 674 (1941).
rs Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955); Shulman v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 823, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Ultra Sucro Co. v.
Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Ciprari v. Aereos
Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., 232 F. Supp. 433, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (dictum); I BARRON &
HOLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.3 (Wright ed. 1960); Kaufman,
Further Observations on Transfers Under Section 1404(a), 56 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1,
12 (1956).
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the bald assumption that section 1404 (a) constitutionally can pre-
empt the whole region of forum non conveniens, without any
further investigation into the effect of such pre-emption upon legiti-
mate state policy, is disquieting, to say the least. In the final analy-
sis, it seems inevitable that courts will on occasion be faced: with
more basic state policies clothed in forum non conveniens terms,
and in that circumstance those courts will be impelled to delve into
the state interests behind the given rule, noting whether they are
discriminatory and whether the federal practice significantly frus-
trates their operation.
A leading case in support of the contention that state forum non conveniens
rules have been pre-empted by § 1404 (a) is Willis v. Well Pump Co., supra. There
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, in an action dismissable under the New
York tort "contacts" rule (see note 11 supra), that "a state rule of forum non
conveniens . . . does not control a federal court, since Congress has explicitly legis-
lated in that field .... ." 222 F.2d at 261. But see note 49 supra.
